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DEFYING THE LAW: NORTHERN PLAINS RESOURCE COUNCIL,
INC. V. SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD AND THE STATE OF
NEPA JURISPRUDENCE
RACHEL SHELTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
As concern mounts over how to address the world's increasingly
severe environmental issues, it is important to examine the United States'
current policies. For over forty years, the touchstone of American
environmental policy has been the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 ("NEPA").' The language of the Act is sweeping and employs a tone
suggesting that the federal government will carefully consider the
environmental impacts of its actions.
Whatever the aims of NEPA may have been, interpretation of the
Act in the court system has endowed it with little substantive purpose.
Specifically, the Supreme Court has construed NEPA narrowly, as a
procedural law with little ability to have a substantive effect on
environmental policy. Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, a
2004 Supreme Court decision, reflects this statutory interpretation and
stands as the current state of the law.2
This Note will examine the Ninth Circuit's 2011 decision in
Northern Plains Resource Council, Inc. v. Surface Transportation Board,
which exceeds the narrow boundaries of the Supreme Court's NEPA
jurisprudence, yet honors the substantive values advanced by the text of the
Act. Part I introduces the structure of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969. Part II then considers the various ways in which courts have
interpreted the Act, focusing on the trigger for action under NEPA, the
relevance of various environmental effects, and the "rule of reason"
analysis. Part III provides an in-depth examination of the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Northern Plains. Finally, Part IV concludes by proposing that,
regardless of whether the decision comports with Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the Ninth Circuit's all-encompassing decision is faithful to
NEPA's purpose and should be adopted by the courts.
*Technical Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, 2013-2014; B.A. 2010, Vanderbilt University; J.D. expected May 2014, University of
Kentucky.
I National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (2013).
2 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004).
N. Plains Res. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Northern Plains construes NEPA broadly, with procedural
requirements that mandate consideration of a wide range of potential
environmental effects before the implementation of federal action. Under
the Ninth Circuit's formulation, NEPA compliance is not limited to
situations in which the agency can directly control the environmental
effects. A comparison between the Ninth Circuit's decision in Northern
Plains and the Supreme Court's decision in Public Citizen reveals several
conflicts. Given the current state of the law, the Ninth Circuit likely
misinterpreted NEPA's requirements which the Supreme Court established
in Public Citizen. However, a close reading of NEPA provisions indicates
that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of what NEPA compliance entails is
true to the spirit of the Act and advances a culture of self-awareness and
sustainability into federal government.
II. STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Criticism of the various interpretations of NEPA requires a
foundational understanding of the law itself. NEPA is codified in several
sections, beginning at 42 U.S.C. § 4321. The first section sets forth the
substantive goals of NEPA.4 The following sections set forth particular
procedures that the government must follow to comply with NEPA. The
Act establishes the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ"), which
guides government entities on proper compliance with NEPA procedures.
The CEQ regulations are listed in Title 40 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, beginning with § 1500.1. The major sections of this Act will
be discussed in detail below.
The first section of the Act states the purpose of NEPA in broad
language, which appears to lend the statute substantive weight:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national
policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and
welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the
ecological systems and natural resources important to the
Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental
Quality.8
4 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2013).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (2013).
6 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2013).
7 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1 et seq. (2013).
'42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2013).
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The following section, states NEPA's policy, recognizing the
"profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components
of the natural environment," as well as the "critical importance of restoring
and maintaining environmental quality."9 The federal government declares
that it will "use all practicable means and measures, including financial and
technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony and fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans." 0
Though the language is vague, NEPA's declared purpose suggests
that the focus of the federal government's environmental policy is to
implement procedures that protect and conserve the environment rather
than serve as mere administrative formalities." The Act not only cites the
crucial role of environmental quality to the general welfare, but also states
that the government will lead the nation in serving as a "trustee" of the
environment.12 As such, it will seek to achieve a balance between use and
degradation of the environment.13
Given such lofty language, it seems reasonable to expect strong
procedural provisions to support NEPA's substantive weight. To comply
with the Act, all federal agencies must consider the environmental impacts
of their decisions to ensure that environmental values are given
"appropriate consideration" in the planning process.14 This is the first of the
two primary purposes of NEPA. If the government's initial assessment of
the potential environmental impact shows that there are no significant risks,
NEPA requires no further action. 15 However, if the initial assessment
determines that the proposed agency action may "significantly affect" the
quality of the environment, the responsible official must prepare a "detailed
statement." 16 This "detailed statement," known as the Environmental
Impact Statement ("EIS"), describes the environmental impact of the
proposal, inevitable adverse environmental effects inherent to the action,
alternatives to the proposal, the relationship between short-term and long-
term usage of the environment, and any "irreversible commitments of
resources" which would result from the proposal. 17 The Act also
contemplates cooperation with foreign nations to develop solutions to
worldwide environmental problems.' 8
9 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(a) (2013).
'0 d at (a).
"42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2013).
1242 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (2013).
3 Id. at (b)(5).
1 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2013).
's40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2013).
642 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2013).
Id. at (C)(5).
SId. at (2)(F).
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In addition, NEPA encourages the dissemination of information on
the environmental impacts of government proposals to the public. '9
Specifically, the Act requires the federal government to "make available to
States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and individuals" information
pertaining to restoration and maintenance of the environment. 20 The
Council on Environmental Quality's regulations reiterates the requirement
of releasing environmental impact information to the public before the
federal government takes action. 2 1 Agencies are asked to make "diligent
efforts" to include the public in NEPA procedures and provide public notice
of NEPA-related hearings and meetings.22 Inviting public scrutiny comports
with the spirit of the law, which addresses the "profound impact" of
humans on their environment.2 3
The entire federal government is responsible for carrying out
NEPA's policies and procedures. It is the "continuing responsibility of the
Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other
essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources" in order to carry out the
policy goals which NEPA envisions.24 The CEQ regulations explicitly
charge the President, federal agencies, and the courts with achieving
NEPA's substantive requirements through enforcement.25
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
NEPA requires the courts to share responsibility of enforcement of
the Act to achieve the substantive goals set forth in § 433 1.26 Whether
federal courts have been faithful to the Act's language is open to debate.
Since the passage of NEPA in 1969, courts have construed the Act to
demand full procedural compliance, but have been relatively flexible in
requiring substantive compliance. 27 Consequently, the dominant
interpretation of the Act has focused on the Environmental Impact
Statement rather than long-term policy goals.28
Supreme Court decisions interpreting NEPA requirements have
narrowly construed the Act, largely deferring to agency decision-making. In
1976, shortly after Congress passed the Act, the Supreme Court decided
'9 Id. at (2)(G); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (2013).
2042 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(G).
21 See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (2013).
22 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (2013).
23 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(a) (2013).
24 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2013).
25 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2013).
26 id
27 PETER ALFANO, NEPA AT 40: PROCEDURE OR SUBSTANCE 9 (2009), available at
http://www.eli.org/pdf/seminars/nepa/alfano.nepa.pdf.28
1d at 10.
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Kleppe v. Sierra Club. 29 In Kleppe, the Sierra Club challenged the
Department of the Interior's failure to prepare a comprehensive EIS on the
possible effects of coal mining in the Northern Great Plains region.30
Though there was no formal proposal for a project affecting that entire
region, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the
Department of the Interior's various local and national undertakings
"contemplated" a regional plan that could require an impact statement.31 In
Kleppe, the D.C. Circuit devised a four-factor balancing test for
determining when contemplated action requires a statement under NEPA,
which considered: "the likelihood and imminence of the program's coming
to fruition the extent to which information is available on the effects of
implementing the expected program and on alternatives thereto the extent to
which irretrievable commitments are being made and options precluded 'as
refinement of the proposed progresses,' and the severity of the
environmental effects should the action be implemented."3 2
The Supreme Court's response to the D.C. Circuit's four-factor test
established a limited role for the judiciary under NEPA. 33 The Court
rejected the test, reasoning that such judicial intervention would encourage
litigation and leave agencies uncertain of their procedural obligations.34
Even when several actions are pending simultaneously, the decision to
prepare a cumulative impact statement belongs solely to the agency, subject
only to judicial review for arbitrariness.3 s The Court's deference to agency
discretion is in accord with an earlier D.C. Circuit case, Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Morton, which held that courts may not impose
unreasonable burdens under NEPA, so long as there is evidence that the
agency took a "hard look" at environmental consequences.3
In Kleppe, the D.C. Circuit set the tone for NEPA jurisprudence,
hindering the Act's ability to advance the substantive environmental policy
that it contemplates. The court's rejection of a balancing test for imposing
further environmental studies limits the court's ability to enforce NEPA.
Furthermore, such deference to agency discretion conflicts with CEQ
regulations, which require the President, agencies, and the courts to share
responsibility for enforcement in order to achieve NEPA's substantive
goals.3 7 However, the court seems to have bowed out. Thus, an agency's
ability to comply minimally, in order to further its own agenda, remains
unchecked.
29 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
30 Id. at 395.
Id. at 403.
32 Id. at 404-05.
" Id. at 418-19.
34 Id. at 406.
" Id at 412.
3
6 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
340 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2013).
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This concern relates to the fulfillment of one of NEPA's two
primary purposes: the availability of environmental information to public
officials before decisions are made.38 As Justice Marshall noted in his
Kleppe dissent, a balancing test that allows for judicial intervention may
provide an adequate means to prevent environmental damage when an
agency fails to act.39 Marshall argued for judicial enforcement of NEPA
during the planning phase of an agency's proposal, rather than in the form
of a challenge after planning is complete.4 0 The purpose of the Act, after all,
is not simply to produce a statement, but to consider environmental
consequences throughout the planning process. 4 1 The statement itself is the
evidence of the underlying decision-making process. 4 2
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def
Council, Inc., the Supreme Court explicitly stated that while NEPA does set
forth substantive goals, it is essentially a procedural statute.43 Specifically,
the Court held that the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission acted in the
context of NEPA did not allow the court to mandate further procedures
beyond those employed by the agency pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act." The Administrative Procedure Act allows a court to set
aside only agency actions which are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 45 The CEQ
regulations, which state that the President, federal agencies, and the courts
share responsibility for enforcing NEPA so as to achieve its substantive
requirements, directly conflict with the Court's interpretation.46 Instead,
Vermont Yankee casts NEPA as a typical administrative statute, which
requires the courts to do nothing more than review for abuse of discretion
41
and glaring error on the part of federal agencies.
In 2004, the Supreme Court handed down another restrictive
reading of NEPA in the Public Citizen case.4 8 As in Kleppe, the Supreme
Court in Public Citizen interpreted NEPA as a limited procedural provision
rather than a substantive provision requiring responsible environmental
stewardship on the part of the federal government. In 1982, Congress
'Id. at (b).
" Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 418 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Because an
early start in preparing an impact statement is necessary if an agency is to comply with NEPA, there
comes a time when an agency that fails to begin preparation of a statement on a contemplated project is
violating the law.").
4
0 Id. at 416.
41 Id at 417.
4 2
1 Id. at 418.
43 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
" Id. at 548; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2013) (explaining rulemaking procedures which bind the
Atomic Energy Commission and other federal agencies).
45 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
440 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2012).
47 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. at 524.
48 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004).
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enacted a moratorium on grants of operating authority in the United States
to motor carriers from Canada and Mexico, authorizing the President to lift
the moratorium in the public interest.4 9 The United States later agreed to lift
the moratorium as a condition of the North American Free Trade
Agreement. 50 The President agreed, with consent contingent upon the
promulgation of new regulations governing Mexican carriers.5' The Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration ("FMCSA") proposed the new rules,
and, pursuant to NEPA, prepared an environmental assessment to determine
the effect of the regulations.s2 The agency did not go on to prepare a full
EIS because it found that its regulations would not have a significant impact
on the environment.53
The Ninth Circuit upheld Public Citizen's challenge to FMCSA's
failure to prepare an EIS, holding that the agency did not consider
adequately the "overall environmental impact of lifting the moratorium"
despite the fact that the rescission was "reasonably foreseeable" at the time
that the FMCSA prepared its environmental assessment.5" The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that an agency is not required to prepare an EIS if
the agency itself does not "cause" the relevant environmental effects.
Because the FMCSA did not have control over whether the moratorium was
lifted, the court declined to consider that it was the cause of any incidental
environmental effects resulting from the increased presence of Mexican
trucks in the United States.5 6 However, several aspects of the Supreme
Court's opinion conflict with the substantive goals of NEPA and the
accompanying CEQ regulations.
A. The Trigger for Action Under NEPA is Whether the Agency Has the
Discretion to Prevent the Action that Causes the Environmental Impact
Public Citizen holds that no agency is responsible for assessing
environmental impacts that it does not cause directly.5 7 In Public Citizen,
the Court required more than a "but for" causal relationship to implicate
NEPA requirements.' 8 Furthermore, it rejected the attempt to link FMCSA
49 Id. at 759.50
d
SId. at 760.
52 Id. at 761.
53 Id. at 762; see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2013) (requiring a detailed statement only where
"major Federal actions" significantly affect the environment).
54 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 762-63 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b)
(2013)).
ss Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 770.
56Id. at 772.
s Id. at 770.
s Id. at 767.
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to the effects of an action it had no authority to prevent. 59 NEPA itself
contemplates a much broader scope for compliance. Nowhere does NEPA
explicitly mention proximate cause as a limit for the preparation of an EIS.
The language of the Act, while recognizing as a practical matter that
different branches of government will confront NEPA separately, suggests
that the federal government should comply with NEPA whenever any of its
actions may be the cause of environmental impacts. The Act prefaces the
requirement for an EIS with a broad declaration of purpose:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest
extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance
with the policies set forth in this chapter, and
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A)utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which
will insure the integrated use of the natural and social
sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and
in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's
environment.6 0
Nowhere does the statute evidence a need for an agency's
assessment to concern only those actions which it has set in motion and
may withdraw. The language of NEPA is broad and inclusive and requires a
statement for "every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.",6
A finding that there is no "but for" causation relieves the
government of responsibility for examining environmental impacts, as long
as the implementing agency has no discretion to stop the action causing the
effects.62 Without a strong enforcement mechanism to bind the federal
government as a whole, particular departments or agencies may be able to
avoid responsibility for environmental assessment by simply shifting the
authority to implement the action to another agency.
In Public Citizen, the President lifted the moratorium, which had
the potential to cause environmental impacts. The FMCSA's role in the
process was to promulgate new regulations for the influx of Mexican
carriers resulting from the moratorium's removal. The Court's finding that
there is no "but for" causation, relieved the government of responsibility for
59 
Id. at 767; see also Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766,
774 (1983).
6 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1)-(2) (2013).
61 Id. at (2)(C).
62 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767.
examining environmental impacts, as long as the implementing agency has
no discretion to stop the action causing the effects. Accordingly, the
FMCSA prepared the initial environmental assessment and issued a finding
that there would be no significant environmental impact resulting from the
implementation of its regulations. 63 However, there is no evidence that the
executive branch issued an assessment of the effects of the President's
lifting of the moratorium. Without a strong enforcement mechanism to bind
the federal government as a whole, particular departments or agencies may
be able to avoid responsibility for environmental assessment by shifting the
authority to implement the action to someone else. With the FMCSA
excused from the burden of assessing any actions that it does not control,
who holds responsibility for assessing the actions of the President or the
Executive branch as a whole?
The CEQ's interpretation of NEPA claims to hold the President
64jointly responsible for enforcement of its provisions. There is no
explanation as to why the President's actions are exempt from an
environmental assessment or why the President is not required to enforce a
law designed to shape the environmental policy decisions of every branch
of the federal government. Perhaps to accomplish this purpose, the Act
should have used more consistent language. Despite requiring joint
enforcement in its initial section, the CEQ regulations quickly switch to
listing duties required of "federal agencies.' The first procedural section
of NEPA requires "all agencies of the Federal government" 66 to prepare an
EIS in response to federal actions affecting the environment. All further
mention of the President and the courts entails standard language
concerning review of an agency's efforts, rather than strong enforcement.
Even assuming that agencies are the primary actors under NEPA, the
Supreme Court has not set parameters for the evaluation of the President's
actions.
B. Are Indirect Effects of a Federal Action Irrelevant?
The use of "but for" causation in establishing the relevance of
environmental effects for NEPA analysis does more than limit the impacts
which may be considered; it also ignores indirect environmental effects that
may result from federal action. The CEQ regulations define "effects" for
6
1 Id. at 752.
6440 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2013).
6' 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2 (A)-(C) (2013).
66 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
67 See e.g. 42 U.S.C. §4333 (2013) (requiring agencies to present policies and procedures to
the President to ensure compliance with NEPA); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (2013) (noting the point at
which judicial review of agency action under NEPA is appropriate).
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purposes of the preparation of the EIS.68 The definition includes both
"direct" effects, those caused by an action and occurring at the same place
and time, and "indirect" effects. 69 "Indirect" effects are the result of federal
action but occur remotely, either in a different place or after the initial
action,70 and include changes in land use and effects on natural ecosystems,
*71
water, and, air.
The Supreme Court restricts NEPA compliance based on
responsibility for the federal action, rather than whether the effects are
direct or indirect.7 2 This strict reliance on "but for" causation, however,
casts doubt on whether indirect effects will be considered relevant in the
future. NEPA takes a holistic approach in addressing any effects which
result from government action, including "any adverse effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented."73 On the other hand, the
Court limits relevancy only to effects that are within the preparing agency's
control; the consideration of other effects may be eliminated from the
planning process. Due to this uncertainty, it is unknown whether indirect or
long-term effects will be weighed appropriately in the consideration of
future federal actions.
C. The "Rule ofReason" - Environmental Impact Statement Must
Contribute to the Decision-Making Process in Order to Be Necessary
In Public Citizen, the Court regarded the failure to prepare an EIS
74as appropriate because the statement would not serve a purpose.
According to the Court, the "rule of reason," which is inherent in NEPA
and the CEQ regulations, "ensures that agencies determine whether and to
what extent to prepare an EIS based on the usefulness of any new potential
information to the decisionmaking process."7 5 While NEPA unquestionably
intends to influence public officials during the planning process of a federal
action, the Act also intends ordinary citizens to have access to information
concerning the environmental impact of government projects. The CEQ
regulations state that NEPA must make information available to public
officials and citizens alike.76
In holding that an EIS is useless if it cannot assist public officials
during the planning process, the Supreme Court dismissed the importance
6' 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2013).
69 id
o Id. at (b).
72 See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004).
73 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii).
74 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767-68.
7
1 d at 767.
76 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (2013).
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of one of the two main purposes of NEPA.77 The Court determined that the
benefits of providing EIS information to the public are outweighed by the
lengthy preparation process, when it does not provide information to
officials when they are able to incorporate it into the planning process.
Although this interpretation may be reasonable at first glance, it is not in
accord with the spirit of NEPA or with the Act's language concerning
public access to information.
IV. NOR THERN PLAINS RESOURCE COUNCIL V SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION BOARD
Despite the restrictive line of NEPA precedent that the Supreme
Court has developed, a few courts continue to interpret NEPA broadly,
requiring proactive enforcement. Northern Plains Resource Council v.
Surface Transportation Board, a recent Ninth Circuit decision, serves as an
example of exceeding the restrictive requirements set for courts in Public
Citizen.79 The Ninth Circuit interpreted NEPA in accordance with the spirit
of the Act, declining to adopt the restrictive scope endorsed by the Supreme
Court. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Northern Plains oversteps Public
Citizen by requiring that the Surface Transportation Board take a "hard look"
at the cumulative environmental impacts inherent in its railroad project, as
well as the coal bed methane ("CBM") development in the region.80 The
court also rejected the Board's attempt to use outdated data in preparing the
EIS.8 ' Northern Plains suggests that the trigger for action under NEPA is
whether or not a federal action causes environmental impact, not whether a
particular agency has the power to regulate or prevent the effects. Although
the court's findings of deficiency present an interpretation of NEPA
compliance which contrasts sharply with that in Public Citizen, the decision
is faithful to the two primary purposes of NEPA: to provide information to
agencies during the decision-making process and to inform the public about
the environmental impact of a federal action.82
Under the Public Citizen interpretation of NEPA, Northern Plains
is too broad and goes beyond what the Supreme Court requires of any
federal agency. Northern Plains, while arguably too broad, is true to the
language and spirit of NEPA and illustrates a few of the difficulties of
developing sound environmental policy going forward.
7 Compare Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (addressing the purpose of an
EIS), with Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (stating two
primary purposes of NEPA).
78 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767.
7 See, e.g., N. Plains Res. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2011).
so Id. at 1076-77.
81 Id. at 1086-87.
82 See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
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A. Case Summary
Northern Plains arose out of a complicated challenge to the Tongue
River Railroad Company's ("TRRC") plan to build a railroad to haul coal
through Southeastern Montana. 83 The Surface Transportation Board
approved three separate applications. 84 The second proposal concerns a
portion of the planned railway, which was modified after legal challenges
prevented the plan from going forward.s The EIS prepared in response to
the new application, referred to as TRRC III, combined parts of the first
two reviews and is the EIS at issue in the case.
As the D.C. Circuit established in Morton early on, NEPA
compliance is satisfactory if the court finds that an agency took a "hard
look" at the proposed action in accordance with NEPA's procedural
requirements.87 The Court found three deficiencies with the EIS at issue.
First, the Surface Transportation Board failed to analyze the "cumulative
88impacts" of the railroad project. Specifically, the Board neglected its duty
to analyze the coal bed methane development used to mine the coal that the
railroad was intended to transport. 89 The Surface Transportation Board's
EIS also lacked adequate baseline data on the affected wildlife species.90
The final deficiency in the Surface Transportation Board's EIS involves
their reliance on "stale data," that is, outdated aerial surveys, for its impact
analysis. 91
B. The Northern Plains Decision Exceeds Supreme Court Precedent
Regarding the Scope of NEPA
The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court frequently conflict with
respect to environmental jurisprudence; in Public Citizen, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that more was required of
FMCSA under NEPA. 92 The Ninth Circuit's imposition of additional
requirements to ensure the Board's compliance with NEPA asks for a
complete picture of the environmental impact of the railroad project. It
contrasts with the Supreme Court's willingness to ignore the less imminent
or obvious effects of an action in favor of narrow procedural requirements
and lighter burdens on federal agencies. Had the Northern Plains decision
83 N. Plains Res. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d at 1072.
84 d
8s Id. at 1073-74.
6 Id. at 1074.
87 Id. at 1075; see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
88 N. Plains Res. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d at 1077.
89 Id
9n Id at 1083.
9' Id. at 1085-86.
92 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 763 (2004).
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been reviewed by the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the Surface
Transportation Board would have been subject to such extensive EIS
requirements.93
The first finding of deficiency highlights the conflict between
Public Citizen and Northern Plains. While Public Citizen established "but
for" causation as the trigger for agency compliance with NEPA
procedures, 94 Northern Plains requires the railroad EIS to include effects of
related coal mining projects which are not part of the railroad proposal.
The court views the inclusion of the effects of future coal bed methane
development as a necessary component of a "cumulative impact" analysis.
The CEQ regulations define "cumulative impact" as the "impact on the
environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when
added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions
regardless of what agency . . . or person undertakes such other actions."
The effects of past actions are exempt from consideration unless they are
necessary to analyze the effects of all past actions combined. 98 The
cumulative impacts of pending and future actions qualify as effects which
agencies must consider in their Environmental Impact Statements."
The Surface Transportation Board limited the scope of its analysis
to a five-year period. This limit disregarded the impact of proposed CBM
wells, as they were planned but had not been constructed.' 00 The court
rejected this reasoning, finding that NEPA requires reasonable speculation
about future effects and requires that agencies recognize projects that are
not yet finalized.o'0 The fact that the Bureau of Land Management and the
state of Montana had completed impact studies on the projected
development of CBM wells over the next twenty years further convinced
the court that the Board could have incorporated cumulative effects data.102
93 The Surface Transportation Board released a statement on June 18, 2012 stating that it
would require Tongue River Railroad Company to submit a revised application and that subsequently it
would conduct environmental review in accord with the Ninth Circuit's decision. SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION BOARD, No. 12-10, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD PROCEEDS ON TONGUE
RIVER RAILROAD'S REVISED CONSTRUCTION PROPOSAL (2012), available at http://stb.dot.gov/
newsrels.nsfl0/7c7l59a5e6e2a41385257a21005ca571.
9 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767.
95 N. Plains Res. Def. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d at 1077.
96 Id.
9 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2013).
9 N. Plains Res. Def. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d at 1076 (quoting COUNCIL
ON ENVTL.. QUALITY, MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERATION OF PAST ACTIONS IN
CUMULATIVE EFFECTS ANALYSIS (2005), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
nepapub/nepa~documents/RedDont/G-CEQ-PastActsCumulEffects.pdf).
9'40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(c)(3) (2012).
00 N. Plains Res. Def. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d at 1077, 1079. (The Board
also omitted an analysis of the cumulative effects of the railroad project and the existing Otter Creek
coal mines in the EIS.)
'o' Id. at 1078-79 (quoting Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren, 336 F.3d 944, 962 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
102 Id. at 1077, 1079.
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In Northern Plains, the Ninth Circuit determined the proper trigger
for action is the possibility of environmental impacts as a result of federal
action. 103 NEPA compliance is not dependent on whether a particular
agency, in this case the Surface Transportation Board, can regulate
reasonably foreseeable environmental effects; instead, the question is
whether those effects exist. Like the FMCSA in Public Citizen, the Surface
Transportation Board has no control over whether or not the mining
projects come to fruition. Its only concern is the approval of transportation
projects, in this case, the construction of a railroad. Under the Supreme
Court's narrower "but for" formulation, the effects of other projects which
the Board does not directly control would be beyond the scope of the
Board's EIS. Under Public Citizen, the Ninth Circuit's reading is too broad.
The second deficiency in Northern Plains, the inadequacy of
baseline data about affected wildlife, may be precluded under the Supreme
Court's formulation of NEPA if the Board's treatment of the issue is
reasonable. The Ninth Circuit viewed the Board's plan to conduct post-
approval studies on the effects of the railroad project on several species of
plants and animals as an insufficient mitigation measurel0 4 According to the
Ninth Circuit, the use of mitigation measures presupposes approval and
does not fulfill either of the two primary purposes of NEPA, which
contemplate that information on environmental impacts will be available to
aid public officials during the decision-making process and to inform the
public about proposed federal action. 105 Nothing in the Public Citizen
directly conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's finding of a deficiency in this
respect. However, given the Supreme Court's narrow construction of NEPA,
it is more likely that a court giving proper precedence to the Supreme
Court's decisions would defer to the Board's judgment.
The final deficiency discussed by the Ninth Circuit was the Surface
Transportation Board's reliance on "stale data," that is, outdated aerial
surveys. The Ninth Circuit found this reliance to be "arbitrary and
capricious" because the Board failed to explain how it used the photographs
to identify the habitats and populations of the region's wildlife. 106
Determining whether an agency's action is "arbitrary and capricious" is
itself a policy judgment. Applying its broad construction of NEPA, the
Ninth Circuit decided that the Surface Transportation Board's reliance on
the stale data was misplaced. However, a narrower construction of NEPA
would likely prompt a different result. The importance of the
characterization of NEPA in Northern Plains is that it more closely
embodies the spirit of the law than current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
'o
3 
Id. at 1072.
* Id. at 1083.
0os Id. at 1084-85.
'6 Id. at 1086.
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C. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis in Northern Plains Accords with the Spirit
of the National Environmental Policy Act
There are two primary differences between the constructions of
NEPA in Northern Plains and Public Citizen: the trigger for action and the
types of environmental effects considered for purposes of the EIS. The
Supreme Court would likely reverse the Ninth Circuit's broad interpretation
of NEPA requirements, which requires a great deal more in terms of agency
compliance. The language of NEPA, however, is broad and substantive in
spirit. The Supreme Court has curtailed the broad sweep of the Act and
rendered it a purely procedural provision, subject to requirements that are
narrower than its language suggests. Northern Plains honors the legislative
intent by amplifying judicial enforcement of NEPA and carefully
scrutinizing federal actions for environmental impacts.
1. The Language of NEPA Supports the Ninth Circuit Interpretation
that Any Significant Environmental Effect Resulting from Federal
Action Is a Trigger for an Impact Statement
From a textual perspective, there is no indication that NEPA was
intended to adopt the causation principles of tort law, as Public Citizen and
Metropolitan Edison Co. suggest. 107 NEPA does not set forth a strict
causation requirement restricting an agency's environmental studies to
consider only those effects that the agency controls or regulates. The trigger
for NEPA compliance in Northern Plains is any finding that federal action
may cause significant environmental impacts. The Northern Plains
approach finds textual support in the Act. NEPA intended each
Environmental Impact Statement to include direct, indirect, and, cumulative
effects resulting from federal action. 108 While Public Citizen restricted
relevant effects to those that an agency may regulate directly, Northern
Plains required a detailed statement which examined the effects of the
project at issue, as well as related projects in the region.
The proper scope for NEPA under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
is broad enough to account for the reasonably foreseeable future effects of a
project and the combined effects of other developments.' 09 In Northern
Plains, the court noted that NEPA analysis is more than a formality-it
must be "useful," rather than "perfunctory." 110 The decision's holistic
approach accords with the Act's emphasis on discerning the impact of
1o7 Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004); Metro. Edison Co. v. People
Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983).
'os 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2013); see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2013) (explaining the term
"cumulative impact").
'09 N. Plains Res. Def. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d at 1079.
"o Id. at 1076.
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man's activity on the "interrelations of all components of the natural
environment.""' The Public Citizen mandate, which limits environmental
assessments to effects resulting directly from the actions of a particular
agency, is essentially willful blindness to the possibility of cumulative harm.
2. The Northern Plains Approach Fulfills the Two Primary
Purposes of NEPA
Public Citizen failed to confer significance to NEPA's mandate that
agencies provide information to the public, despite the clear language of the
Act. 112 The Supreme Court stopped short of requiring further compliance
with NEPA. This was due in part to its conclusion that the main purpose of
providing information to public officials was to inform their decision-
making process.1 3 In the Court's view, whether information concerning the
emissions of Mexican motor carriers was valuable to the interested
members of the public was not important, because the public could not
* * 114participate in the decision-making process.
In some respects, the Supreme Court's analysis adheres to the text
of the Act. NEPA envisions the release of information as a mechanism to
"encourage and facilitate public involvement" in agency decisions. "
However, the Court's commitment to allowing public access to information
is contingent on whether the public has an effect on the government's
decision. Arguably, the public deserves to know of the effects of
government action, whether that action is pending or has already been
instated.
NEPA considers the importance of general public awareness of
potential environmental impacts. In addition to providing information to
involve the public in the decision-making process, NEPA states that
information "useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of
the environment" should be made available to individuals, States, and local
governments.1 16 This is a broader mandate than the provision requiring
agencies to share information to foster public participation in the decision-
making process and suggests the importance of the availability of
information even after a decision is made. In Northern Plains, the Ninth
Circuit demonstrated its commitment to upholding the public information
purpose of NEPA. The second deficiency the court identified with respect
to the Surface Transportation Board's EIS concerned the planned use of
mitigation measures, rather than solid baseline data to study potential
n' 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2013).
112 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(G)(2013); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(d) (2013).
" Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004).
114 Id. at 768.
us 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(d) (2013).
116 42 U.S.C. § 4332(G) (2013).
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effects on plant and animal species."' According to the court, the use of
mitigation measures fails to serve either of the two primary purposes of
NEPA."' Like the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit stated that this failure
deprives the public of the opportunity to participate in the agency's
decision-making process."'9 More importantly, the court also noted that the
failure to provide adequate baseline data about the impact on wildlife
prevents the EIS from serving its "larger informational role." 20
The Ninth Circuit's nuanced reasoning clearly reflects NEPA's
goal of providing the public with information. An agency may present
information pertinent to "restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality
of the environment" at any time to foster public awareness of the
environmental impacts inherent in government projects. 121 Even if a
particular proposal has already been approved, information concerning its
effects may shape public opinion about future proposals. The Supreme
Court's characterization of NEPA's public information requirements
oversimplifies its purpose by focusing solely on whether access to
information would enable the public to intervene during the planning
process.
V. CONCLUSION
Northern Plains is an example of jurisprudence which, contrary to
the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretive guidelines, complies with the
spirit of the National Environmental Policy Act. Whether NEPA itself
embodies sound environmental policy is a separate issue. Read as a
procedural provision, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act seems
to be little more than an exercise in futility. Under the Ninth Circuit's more
substantive interpretation, the Act creates a longer delay of federal action.
Certainly, the Northern Plains decision has presented a bureaucratic
headache for both the Tongue River Railroad, whose project has been
significantly delayed while awaiting federal approval, and the Surface
Transportation Board, which must now reassess the railroad's application.
Compliance with NEPA does not encourage efficient action. Perhaps
Congress intended NEPA to put a stop to projects after environmental
impact assessments result in negative reports. It is unclear whether the
greater scrutiny of Northern Plains stops harmful projects in their tracks,
pushes agencies to make decisions more considerate of potential
environmental impacts, or simply requires extensive and expensive
paperwork for projects that will eventually be approved.
" N. Plains Res. Def. Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011).
"' Id. at 1085.
19Id.
120 id.
121 42 U.S.C. § 4332(G) (2013).
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Do we need a new environmental policy for the 21st century?
Arguably, current implementation of NEPA provisions does not provide the
government or the public with the tools to positively influence our
government's impact on the environment. Interpretation of NEPA appears
to give less than serious consideration to the Act's purpose, perhaps
creating the situation that the CEQ regulations warned against - the
generation of paperwork, rather than the promotion of action.12 2 Given the
current political and economic climate, any substantive alternative to NEPA
is unlikely to develop in the near future. Greater substantive requirements-
or interpretation of NEPA as a largely substantive Act-would delay
government decision-making and decrease efficiency, a reality that is
unlikely to win over an American public preoccupied with economic, rather
than environmental, woes.
As resources dwindle and debates over climate change intensify,
environmental issues will become increasingly difficult to ignore. How the
federal government will respond to global environmental problems remains
an open question. A positive step would be to adopt the attitude espoused in
NEPA's declaration of policy; the federal government should focus its
resources on ensuring that man and nature can exist in harmony.123 The
courts must provide an all-encompassing, rather than restrictive and
incomplete review of actions, which negatively affect the natural world, as
the Ninth Circuit attempted to do in Northern Plains. Whatever its flaws or
inefficiencies, this is likely what NEPA was intended to accomplish.
122 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2013).
'2 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(a) (2013).
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